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Abstract
We develop an endogenous growth model to address a long standing question whether
sustainable green growth is feasible by re-allocating resource use between green (natural)
and man-made (carbon intensive) capital. Although the model is general we relate it to
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reproducible inputs, green and man-made capital. The growth of man-made capital causes
depreciation of green capital via carbon emissions and related externalities which the pri-
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rms to substitute man-made capital with green capital in so far the production technology
allows. Doing so, the damage to natural capital by emissions can be partly reversed through
a lower socially optimal long run growth. The trade-o¤ between environmental quality and
long-run growth can be overcome by a pollution abatement technology intervention. How-
ever, if the source of pollution is consumption, the optimal carbon tax is zero and there
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then needed to 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1. Introduction
In the UK, the agship of growth Industrial Strategy is to boost green growth
through the promotion of cost e¤ective low carbon technologies. While the industrial
strategy lays out the goals of clean growth, it is less clear about the trade-o¤s facing
the economy in meeting this target. The challenge emanates from a long standing
theoretical and policy debate in resource and environment economics on whether
growth is possible without exhausting natural resources. Since natural resources
(hereafter natural or green capital) are part of the capital stock, we dene sustainable
growth in terms of the aggregate capital stock. Broadly, aggregate capital is the sum
total of natural and man-made capital. According to Heal (2017), an economy is
sustainable if the value of aggregate capital stock is nondecreasing.
The proponents of strong sustainability (e.g, Daly, 1997; Ayres, 2007), however,
take the stand that the stock of natural capital must be non-decreasing which
disallows substitution between natural and man-made capital. Solow (1974) and
Nordhaus and Tobin (1972) take a weak sustainability view that some degree of sub-
stitution is possible between these two types of capital.1 The crux of the debate boils
down to whether natural and man-made capital are substitutable and a socially ac-
ceptable sustainable low carbon growth is achievable. If so, what policy instruments
could accomplish this task?
This paper addresses the question using the lens of a simple endogenous growth
model. The endogeneity of growth is crucial for understanding sustainability of
1For a recent survey on the sustainability issues of growth, see Cerkez (2018).
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growth. An exogenous growth model would not be helpful because the sustainable
growth depends on some unexplained exogenous engine of growth which is the cen-
tral focus of this paper. Growth economists are deeply divided on the remaining
issue whether there is enough empirical validity of the endogenous growth models.
The standard tests of the endogenous growth model involve testing the convergence
hypothesis and nding evidence in favour of broad based reproducible capital which
mitigates the diminishing returns to capital. Barro (1991), Barro and Sala-i-Martin
(2004), Mankiw, Romer andWeil (1992) and Young (1995) nd some evidence of con-
vergence. However, their convergence results are criticized by Bernard and Durlauf
(1995), Quah (1996), Philips and Sul (2003) among others. A prototype AK en-
dogenous growth model of Rebelo (1991) uses a broad based capital as a vehicle of
growth. This model is criticized by Jones (1995) but defended strongly by McGrat-
tan (1998).2 We develop a variant of this AK endogenous growth model where the
broad based capital is composed of man-made and natural capital.
In our model, sustainable growth implies a low-carbon balanced growth. Man-
made carbon intensive capital is augmented by private investment. The private
sector, while determining its optimal accumulation of man-made capital, does not
internalize the damage it inicts on the natural or green capital base due to emis-
sions. A benevolent government designs a Pigovian type tax-subsidy and a public
investment programme to correct for this externality. Doing so, the government
seeks a Pareto optimal mix of man-made and green capital. The underlying produc-
tion technology is kept general to allow for di¤erent degrees of substitution between
2For an excellent survey of the empirics of endogenosus growth models, see Capoloupo (2009).
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green and man-made capital. The strong sustainability approach to growth arises as
a special case in our setting when the production function has zero substitutability
between green and man-made capital.
The punch-line of our analysis is that when the source of emissions is production,
there is a trade-o¤ between environmental policy and growth. This trade-o¤ arises
due to the fact that a carbon tax distorts the resource allocation. This adverse e¤ect
on growth is fundamentally due to the absence of a pollution abatement technology.
We then present a scenario where an emissions abatement technology is in place. In
this scenario, a combination of carbon tax, public investments in abatement and
green capital replenishment could restore the Pareto optimal proportion of man-
made to green capital. Greater e¢ ciency in pollution abatement boosts the long run
growth and lowers the depreciation of green capital and lowers the carbon tax. A
pollution abatement technology also presents a pathway to resilience to a climate
shock.
Our results are consistent with the current envrironmental policy of net-zero
carbon emissions which aims to lower emissions while recognizing that zero emissions
is not possible.3 In our model, green depreciation can be e¤ectively eliminated by an
optimal carbon tax and a carbon abatement technology. The cost of such cabon tax
is the distortion inicted on the private sector which can be considerably lowered by
making abatement technology more e¢ cient. After netting out this cost, a net-zero
carbon emissions is still possible.
3The UK is the rst major economy that has committed itself to a legally binding net-zero
carbon emission target by 2050.
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Finally, we extend our model to characterize the e¤ect of consumption based
emissions. In this version, it is consumption not production that contributes to the
green house e¤ect. In a progress report to the UK parliament, the Committee on
Climate Change (CCC) reports that consumption based emissions are more perva-
sive in UK than emissions resulting from production. An example is food wastage.
The UK consumption emissionss were rising before the nancial crisis but then fell
between 2007 and 2009. Since then it fell by only 3% while production emissions
declined by 15% (CCC, June 2018, pp. 32).
We ask the question: what are the consequences of consumption based emissions
on sustainable growth? We show that growth is unaltered by these emissions because
they have no e¤ect on the static e¢ ciency condition for resource allocation. Since
consumption is the source of emission, the optimal carbon tax is zero in this settting.
A corrective consumption tax is needed to nance public investment programme in
order to replenish the green capital destroyed by emissions. Although such con-
sumption based emissions have no adverse e¤ect on growth, they negatively impact
societal welfare due to lost consumption from consumption tax. If the emissions are
due to consumption waste, a consumption tax can correct for this by nancing a
public investment programme in green capital. Our model based simulation suggests
that the consumption equivalent of welfare loss is higher in an economy with higher
consumption based emissions.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the back-
ground and briey surveys the related literature. Section 3 sets up a social planning
problem which characterizes the socially optimal sustainable growth with optimal
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public and private investments in green and man-made capital. Section 4 develops a
model of a decentralized economy with a benevolent government in order to deter-
mine the optimal carbon tax, subsidy and public investment which could replicate
the allocation of the social planning optimum. The strong sustainability view is
shown as a special case of our baseline model where there is strict complementarity
between man made and natural capital. Section 5 reports the simulation results of
our baseline model. Section 6 extends the model to include public investment in
pollution abatement. Section 7 analyzes the case of consumption based emissions.
Section 8 concludes.
2. Background
In the UK and other countries, the moves to decarbonise the economies are driven
by the desire to avoid the economic, social and ecological consequences of climate
change and environmental degradation. These e¤orts are supported by increasing
scientic and economic reasoning. The scientic case for action is based on the wide-
reaching consequences of climate change and the urgency to act in order to avoid the
tipping point beyond which the impacts become irreversible (Lenton et al., 2019).
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) has warned that large scale
discontinuity in the climate system is likely even at a temperature threshold of 1.5
degree C. Various adverse e¤ects of climatic change can manifest which include river
and coastal ooding and steep rise in energy cooling.
Moreover, the economic case for decarbonisation suggests that the cost of acting
to decarbonise sooner is lower than the damage from inaction which is increasing
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with time (Stern, 2007). At the macroeconomic level the decarbonisation e¤ort is
closely linked to the issue of economic growth and sustainability. More precisely,
our central interest is addressng the following question: how can decarbonisation be
achieved while maintaining a sustained growth with a socially desrable proportion
of green to man-made capital?
According to the European Commission, green or natural capital is dened as
environment friendly replenishable resources. Examples of replenishable natural
capital are reforestation, use of solar energy, and improving air and water quality.
According to the UK O¢ ce for National Statistics (ONS), natural capital includes
resources such as mineral reserves, energy reserves, net greenhouse gas sequestration,
outdoor recreation, agricultural land and timber, and water abstracted for public
water supply. In comparison, man-made capital consists of assets such as machinery
and urban land (EC, 2017). ONS (2019) estimates the value of the UKs main
ecoservices in 2016 at about £ 958 bill.
In principle, green economic growth can be achieved by substituting polluting
man-made capital with non-polluting green capital and investment to increase the
stock of natural capital (EFTEC, 2015). The substitution needs to be facilitated by
developing new technologies. However, the existing energy and clean technologies
are not su¢ cient for achieving high levels of decarbonisation of the economy. Deep
decarbonisation requires substantial investments as well as development of new tech-
nologies, something which requires investment and time.
According to the UK Committee for Climate Change (CCC, 2018) the total
annual capital investment in the UK economy ranged from 15% to 24% of GDP over
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1990-2017; our scenarios imply an extra green investment of around 1% in 2050. The
CCC (2018) scenarios estimate the investment requirement of achieving net-zero to
be comparable to the 2008 estimates for 80% emissions reduction relative to 1990
levels. The lower new estimates reect a reduction in the cost of renewable and green
technologies through innovation.
Connections to literature
Our paper relates to a wave of literature on the e¤ect of environmental tax on eco-
nomic growth. Forster (1973) analyzes optimal capital accumulation in the presence
of pollution. His framework was subsequently extended by Gruver (1976), Luptacik
and Schubert (1982), and Siebert (1987). Gradus and Smulders (1993) do a com-
prehensive analysis of the environmental policy in terms of pollution abatement.4
Using a learning by doing technology and pollution distaste in the utility function,
Michel and Rotillon (1995) argue that capital should be mostly taxed to combat the
pollution distaste. A feature of their model is that a social optimum that internalizes
pollution distaste might lead to a zero long run growth unless there is strong con-
sumption compensation for pollution distaste. Gars and Olovsson (2019) document
that countries using fossil fuel instead of biofuel embark on a higher growth path and
develop an endogenous growth model that explains this. In many of these papers,
a common theme is that there is a trade-o¤ between environmental protection and
growth.
4Using a two good general equilibrium model, Hollady et al. (2018) examine the e¤ect of
environmental regulation on the emissions leakage in the presence trade frictions They analyze the
e¤ect of an emissions tax but abstract from capital accumulation, growth and production based
externality from emission which is our primary focus in this paper.
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Our model is closer in spirit to the Dynamic Integrated Model of Climate and
the Economy (DICE) of Nordhaus (2018) who uses Cass-Koopmans growth models
with forward looking agents to analyze the economic e¤ects of climate change. In
the DICE model, many aspects of the environment are mapped into temperature
as a single state variable. Such a mapping is motivated by natural science modules
where fossil fuel emissions lead to higher temperature due to greenhouse e¤ect. In
the spirit of the DICE model, we characterize the production of a single composite
nal good with labour, fossil intensive man-made capital and natural capital. The
natural capital depreciates due to green house e¤ects of carbon intensive man-made
capital.
The technology of nal goods production is similar to Gars and Olovsson (2019).
We have two kinds of capital, man-made (fossil fuel intensive) and green capital
(biofuel intensive) in our production function. The novelty of our setting is that
we let the stock of green capital erode due to carbon emissions from man-made
capital to model the e¤ects of climate shock on the aggregate economy. Although
man-made capital erodes the green capital base, there is inherent complementarity
between these two types of capital in the production process. This complementarity
gives rise to a socially optimal positive sustainable growth. We demonstrate this by
setting up a social planning problem which lays out the Pareto optimal ratio of man-
made to green capital where man-made capital can damage the green capital base.
We then describe a market economy where the private sector fails to internalize the
adverse e¤ect of its investment in man-made capital on green capital. A corrective
tax-subsidy and green public investment programme are then designed which could
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replicate the socially optimal green growth rate.
Our market economy model replicates the e¢ cient allocation using the tax-
subsidy mechansim as an environmental policy instrument. Alternatively, one can
introduce pollution permits as an environmental policy instrument where a xed
number of pollution permits are auctioned o¤ by the government to pollutant rms.
Invoking Coase theorem, one can hope to achieve e¢ cient allocations. We do not
take this avenue because of the limitations of this approach due to the free rider
problem pointed out by Chari and Jones (2000).
3. Sustainability of growth as a social planning problem
The economy produces the nal output (Yt) with broad based capital (Kt) and
a unit raw labour with a linear technology as in Rebelo (1991):
Yt = AKt (1)
where A is a constant total factor productivity (TFP) term. The aggregate capital is
composed of man-made (Kpt ) and green capital (K
g
t ) based on the following constant
elasticity of substitution (CES) aggregation:
Kt =
h
(1  )Kp't + Kg
'
t
i1='
(2)
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with 0 <  < 1;and ' = (   1)= where  is the elasticity of substitution. Note
that since  is positive by construction  1 < ' < 1.5
The man-made capital evolves according to the linear depreciation rule:
Kpt+1 = (1  p)Kpt + Ipt (3)
where Ipt is the level of private investment in man-made capital and p is its rate of
depreciation.
A benevolent social planner invests a fraction of nal output, igyt to replenish
green capital by planting trees among other means.6 The law of motion of the green
capital stock is given by:7
Kgt+1 = (1  gt)Kgt + igytYt (4)
The depreciation rate of green capital (gt) is proportional to the ratio of private
to green capital. More man-made capital relative to green capital causes erosion of
5Our production fnction is similar in spirit to Gars and Olovsson (2019). In their model, the
production of nal goods requires the use of biofuel and fossil fuel which are produced capital stock
di¤erent varieties. In our setting, we abstract from varieties and focus on a production function
involving green (biofuel intensive) capital and man-made (fossil intensive) capital.
6We represent the investment in man-made capital in level but green investment in rate. This
distinction is crucial to justify a carbon tax rate in a decentralized economy.
7Here, we are assuming that there is no adjustment cost for changing man-made and green
capital. Aggregate output can be converted to man-made and green capital with equal ease. While
this is a stretch from the reality, it is also true that di¤erential adjustment costs for changing these
two types of capital may not have any long run growth consequences. One can add di¤erential
adjustment costs of man-made and green capital which is zero in the steady state. Thus the
balanced growth rate will be unaltered by the presence of such adjustment cost. Since the central
interest of this paper is on sustainable growth, we make this simplifying assumption.
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green capital (in the form of deforestation and climate change). In other words:
gt = !t
Kpt
Kgt
(5)
A few clarications about the green depreciation rate, gt are in order. The term
!t represents net erosion of green capital per unit of man-made capital due to the
carbon emissions of the latter capital. This erosion is caused by the technology of
investment, but it can be managed by pollution abatement technology to which we
turn later. In principle, green capital can regenerate and the net erosion could be
negative. In our model, !t is the single state variable as the temperature is in the
DICE model of Nordhaus (2018). For our baseline model, we assume that !t is time
invariant meaning !t = ! for all t and is exogenous. Hereafter, we call ! the rate
of green erosion. The social planner takes the emission technology (5) and the net
erosion rate as given and designs a Pareto optimal ratio of man-made to green capital
and a path of public investment in green capital.
Plugging (5) into (4), the law of motion of green capital reduces to:
Kgt+1 = K
g
t   !Kpt + igytYt (6)
The social planner determines a socially desirable sustainable green growth that
maximizes the welfare of a representative innitely lived agent. Noting that Ct is
the consumption of the agent at date t and  is a constant discount factor, formally
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the optimization problem is written as:
Max
1X
t=0
t lnCt (7)
s.t.
Ct + I
p
t  (1  igyt)Yt (8)
and (1), (2), (3), (6), (8) and also the inequality constraint igyt  1. We do not impose
any non-negativity constraint on either igyt and I
p
t because we allow for disinvestment
in both types of capital.
Assuming an interior solution, the planner chooses the time paths of man-made
and green capital to equate the marginal product of man-made with the marginal
product of green capital, net of depreciation rates of both types of capital.8 In other
words, the following static e¢ ciency condition must hold:


Kgt
Kpt

= 	

Kgt
Kpt

+ ! + p (9)
where


Kgt
Kpt

= A
@Kt
@Kpt
= A(1  )

(1  ) + 

Kgt
Kpt
' 1 ''
(10)
and
	

Kgt
Kpt

= A
@Kt
@Kgt
= A
"
 + (1  )

Kgt
Kpt
 '# 1 ''
(11)
8The derivation is available in the appendix. We assume an interior solution for the social
planning problem assuming the green investment rate igyt does not hit the upper bound. For
plausible parameter values, we nd that this is a reasonable assumption which keeps the growth
self sustained.
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We have the following proposition.
Proposition 1. Based on the static e¢ ciency condition (9), a unique ratio of green
to man-made capital, K
g
t
Kpt
exists.
Proof. It follows from the fact that(0) = A(1 )1=' ; 0

Kgt
Kpt

> 0 and	(0) =1,
	0

Kgt
Kpt

< 0. Thus, there exists a unique crossing point in the positive quadrant
between 

Kgt
Kpt

and 	

Kgt
Kpt

+!+p schedules. Figure 1 demonstrates the existence
of a unique Kgt =K
p
t
Next, note that since there is no non-negativity restriction on both types of
investment, there is no transitional dynamics in this environment. Regardless of
the initial stocks of both types of capital, the following balanced growth rate () is
attained immediately.
1 +  = 

1 + 	

Kgt
Kpt

(12)
Figure 1: Existence of Kgt =K
p
t
Using the implicit function theorem, and exploiting the fact that 0

Kgt
Kpt

> 0
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and 	0

Kgt
Kpt

< 0, it is straightforward to verify that
@(Kgt =K
p
t )
@!
=
1h
0

Kgt
Kpt

 	0

Kgt
Kpt
i > 0
The e¢ ciency condition dictates that a shift to a technology that causes greater ero-
sion of green capital (higher !) requires more stringent quantity control of man-made
capital by either divesting in man-made capital or investing in green capital. Either
of these two actions or a combination of them boosts the ratio Kgt =K
p
t . The social
planner mandates a higher ratio of green to man-made capital when the environmen-
tal damage is higher. This can also be easily checked from Figure 1. Higher ! makes
the 	 (:) + ! + p shift out resulting a higher equilibrium K
g
t =K
p
t .
The balanced growth rate () must satisfy the following conditions:
1 +  = 

1 + 	

Kgt
Kpt

(13)
Since 	0(:) < 0; the implication is that a higher green erosion rate (!) unambiguously
lowers the balanced growth rate via a rise in Kgt =K
p
t . Therefore, growth is highest
with zero erosion.
Using (6), the steady state investment ratio in green capital is given by:
igy =
 + !(Kpt =K
g
t )
A [(1  )(Kpt =Kgt ) ' + ]1='
(14)
Higher erosion (!) lowers growth () as well as the socially optimal ratio of man-
made to green capital (Kpt =K
g
t ): The e¤ect on the fraction of nal output invested
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to replenish green capital, igy is nonlinear. It depends on the erosion rate (!) and the
resulting substitution of man-made by green capital. If this substitution is strong,
the e¢ cient investment in green capital could fall due to a decline in !(Kpt =K
g
t ):
4. A decentralized economy with carbon tax
We now describe how a government can replicate the social planning allocation
described in the preceding section by a corrective tax-subsidy scheme in a decen-
tralized economy. The private sector consists of rms and households. Competitive
rms produce nal goods using the production function (2). Households own the
man-made capital, accumulate it and rent it at a competitive price (rt) every period
to the rms for nal goods production. Households supply one unit of labour for
the production of nal goods at a competitive wage (wt). While producing nal
goods, the private sector does not internalize the damage caused to green capital
based on (5). The government imposes a carbon tax (t) on the rental income of
rms in a Pigovian fashion to correct for the externality and uses the tax proceeds to
nance green investments and transfers (Tt) to households. The government budget
constraint is:
trtK
p
t = i
g
ytYt + Tt (15)
where the public investment ratio {igyt} satises (6).
The household takes the stock of green capital {Kgt} as well as the sequences
{t}, {Tt}, {wt} and {rt} as parametrically given, and maximizes (7) subject to the
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following ow budget constraints and the private investment technology (3):9
Ct + I
p
t = wt + (1  t)rtKpt + Tt (16)
The Euler equation facing the household is:
Ct+1
Ct
=  [(1  t+1)rt+1 + 1  p] (17)
The zero prot condition dictates that the competitive rental price of capital equals
the marginal product of private capital which means
rt+1 = 

Kgt+1
Kpt+1

(18)
4.1. Optimal carbon tax
The government designs the time path of the carbon tax such that the private
marginal benet of investing in man-made capital exactly balances the social mar-
ginal benet given by the social planners Euler equation (13). The optimal carbon
tax is:
t =
!


Kgt
Kpt
 (19)
Plugging the e¢ cient time path of Kgt =K
p
t from the social planning problem, one can
generate the time path of the carbon tax, t.
9Since the household takes Kgt as given, it faces a constant returns to scale technology involving
Kpt and inelastic labour which is normalized at unity. :
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4.2. Strong sustainability
Proponents of strong sustainability take the stand that natural and man made
capital are not substitutable. This arises as a special case when there is zero elasticity
of substitution ('  !  1) between these two types of of capital. In this case the
production function (1) takes the Leontief form:
Yt = A min [K
p
t ; K
g
t ] (20)
The e¢ cient ratio of green to man-made capital is unity. Based on (5), the green
depreciation rate along a balanced growth path is given by:
gt = ! (21)
Since strict complementarity disallows any substitution between two types of capital,
higher emissions rate (!) causes irreversible damage to green capital base.
The balanced growth rate is given by:
1 +  = 

1 +
A  !   p
2

(22)
Higher erosion rate unambiguously lowers the long run growth rate as in the previ-
ous scenario because of the destruction caused by man-made capital. The optimal
investment rate in green capital (14) is:
igy =
f1 + 0:5(A  p)g   1 + !(1  0:5)
A
(23)
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Higher ! unambiguously raises the socially optimal public investment in green cap-
ital. The government has to engage in a public investment programme to replenish
green capital, permanently damaged by man-made capital.10
Such an investment programme must be nanced by a carbon tax. The optimal
carbon tax in the case of a xed coe¢ cient production function (20) is given by:
 = 0:5 + A 1(1  0:5p) + 0:5A 1! (24)
which rises unambiguously with respect to !.
5. Simulation
We perform model simulations of our baseline production based emission model
to assess the e¤ects of green capital erosion on the aggregate economy. In order to
carry out any quantitative exercise, we take a stand on setting the long run growth
target for the UK economy. We set a baseline target growth rate for the UK economy
of 2% at a zero emission rate. This target is in line with the long term annual average
growth rate of UK real GDP over the period 1947-2018 from the St. Louis Federal
Reserve database (FRED) which is found to be 2.47%. One may debate whether this
is a reasonable target given that the UK economy, in recent years, has slowed down
(1.47% in 2019). Since there are no reliable GDP growth rate forecasts for the UK,
we take 2% as a reasonable growth target.
Regarding the choice of the value of the discount factor  opinions considerably
10See the appendix for a proof of (23).
19
di¤er. Prescott (1986) sets  equal to 0.96 for calibrating the US economy to annual
data which means a 4% steady state real interest rate. This estimate is used in
many calibration exercises of macro models. Given the assumption of a logarithmic
utility function which is also widely used in quantitative macroeconomics literature
following Prescott (1996), a 2% growth rate together with  equal to 0.96 implies a
social discount rate of 6%.11 This social discount rate is too high in the context of
climate change involving the future generations welfare. Green Book (2018) suggests
that the social discount rate is 3.5% based on a 2% growth rate and an implicit
assumption of a logarithmic utility function. On the other hand, the Stern report
(2007) takes a radical stand that the social discount rate is around 0.05%. We x 
equal to 0.98 which means that the social discount rate is 4%. We also perform a
sensitivity analysis in order to check how our quantitative analysis di¤ers when  is
changed in this neighborhood.
Following Prescott (1996), the depreciation rate of man-made capital, p; is xed
at 0:1 which implies a 2.5% quarterly depreciation rate used in several studies. With
all these parameter values, the TFP parameter, A; needs to be xed at 0.127. The
elasticity and share parameters are xed at ' = 0:5 and  = 0:5 respectively. With
these values, we obtain a long run annual growth target of 2% for the UK economy
at ! = 0. At this target zero emissions, the ratio of consumption to GDP and man
11For a mature economy on a balanced growth path, the so called accounting rate of interest is
equal to the consumption rate of interest. The standard rule in social cost benet literature is that
along the balanced growth path, the social discount rate () is equal to growth rate (g) times the
intertemporal elasticity of substitution in consumption (say, ) plus the impatience rate (1   ).
See Bell (2003, Ch 10) for a discussion of this and other rules for . Given our g = 0:02 and  =6 1
due to our logarithmic utility assumption, it implies that  = 0:04:
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made investment to GDP are found to be 42.7% and 19.2% respectively while the
green investment rate is 38.7%.
Figure 2 plots the e¤ect of green erosion (!) on the aggregate economy. Starting
from a zero erosion, a higher ! can be thought of as a climate shock. In response
to such a shock, the carbon tax rate rises sharply from zero to a rate which induces
rms to substitute man-made capital for green capital. Public investment rate in
green capital required to replenish green capital rises while the private investment
rate falls. The consumption rate of the current generation rises which reects a
substitution e¤ect of carbon tax encouraging the household to consume more and
invest less in man-made capital. The green depreciation rises because the rise in
the ratio of green to man-made capital is not enough to lower the depreciation of
green capital. However, the ratio of green depreciation remains close to zero. The
lower growth reects the distortionary e¤ect of a higher carbon tax highlighting the
classic environmental policy and growth trade-o¤. Although the consumption rate
is higher, the negative growth e¤ect depresses the societal welfare.12
12The welfare function is specied later.
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Figure 2: E¤ect of a climate shock on the aggregate economy
Anticipating disparate opinions about the choice of the social discount rate, we per-
form a sensitivity analysis of the key variables by changing the social discount rate.
Changing the discount factor  from 0.98 to 0.995 is equivalent to changing the social
discount rate from 4% to 2.5% given the same balanced growth rate of 2%. Table
1 presents the results of this sensitivity analysis. A lower social discount rate raises
the target growth rate from 2 to 3.58%. This increase in green investment takes
place at the expense of a drastic reduction in man-made investment rate and lower
societal consumption rate. This reduction of man-made investment happens since at
a zero emission rate green capital does not depreciate while man-made capital does.
If society is more forward looking, people are better o¤ investing more in green capial
with zero depreciation.
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Table 1: Sensitivity of zero emission targets with respect to the social discount rate
 0.98 0.985 0.99 0.995
 2.02% 2.54% 3.06% 3.58%
ig=y 38.10% 47.9% 57.78% 67.63%
ip=y 19.2% 20.03% 21.36% 10.68%
c=y 42.7% 32.03% 20.86% 21.69%
6. Overcoming adverse e¤ect of emissions on growth: Decarbonisation
The punch-line of our baseline production based emissions model is that there is
a critical trade-o¤ between environmental policy and long-run growth unless there
is an e¤ort to abate the emissions by lowering !t: This requires public investment in
emissions abatement. In this section, we extend our model to explore such possibility.
Suppose in addition, to green investment (igyt), a fraction of GDP (i
!
yt) is spent on
emissions abatement. Formally, we introduce an emissions abatement technology as
follows:
!t = $   {($)i!yt (25)
If there is no public investment in emission abatement, emission is simply $. The
higher the investment in emissions abatement, the lower the emissions via the abate-
ment technology (25). The e¤ectiveness of the emissions abatement is captured by
the parameter { which is an increasing function of the exogenous emissions $. We
call {($) an intervention function for combating climate shock. A higher green house
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e¤ect (higher $) can be combated by a more e¢ cient abatement technology (e.g.
e¢ cient carbon capturing) which means a higher {.13 The exact functional form for
{($) depends on the time to intervene and proactiveness of the pollution agency
in response to a climate shock. In the following section, we give an illustration of a
specic intervention pattern.
The social planning problem (7) now changes to:
Max
1X
t=0
t lnCt (26)
s.t.
Ct + I
p
t  (1  igyt   i!yt)Yt (27)
and (1), (2), (3), (6), (8) and igyt + i
!
yt < 1:
The new rst order condition for abatement investment (i!yt) equates the marginal
benet of abatement investment to the marginal abatement cost in terms of foregone
national output. In other words,
{($)Kpt = AKt (28)
13There are various ways of abating pollution. The Global Commission on the Economy and
Climate in their technical report suggests several pathways for this which include: (i) more com-
pact urban form with greater use of public transport, (ii) improving agricultural productivity, (iii)
removal of fossil fuel subsidies, (iv) transition from coal, (iv) phasing out short lived climate pol-
lutants such as black carbon, methane, HFCs, (v) emissions from oil and gas, (v) reduced food
wastage called waste resource action programme (WRAP). See
https://newclimateeconomy.report/workingpapers/wp-content/uploads/sites/5/2016/04/NCE-
technical-note-emission-reduction-potential_nal.pdf
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which immediately pins down the Pareto optimal ratio of green to man-made capital
as follows:
Kgt
Kpt
=

({($)=A)   1 + 

1=
(29)
Notice that the ratio of green to man-made capital is constant and it holds in both
short run and long run equilibrium. Higher abatement e¢ ciency ({) unambiguously
raises the ratio of green to man-made capital.
The static e¢ ciency condition (9) is modied after including abatement invest-
ment as follows:


Kgt
Kpt

= 	

Kgt
Kpt

+ (!t + p)=(1  i!yt) (30)
Plugging (29) into the modied static e¢ ciency condition (30), the optimal abate-
ment investment is:
i!yt =
	

Kgt
Kpt

 

Kgt
Kpt

+ p +
 
!
{ + 	

Kgt
Kpt

 

Kgt
Kpt
 (31)
The balanced growth equation (13) now nets out the abatement investment. It is
given by:
1 +  = 

1 + (1  i!yt)	

Kgt
Kpt

(32)
The steady state green investment ratio (14) changes to:
igy =
 + ($   {i!yt)(Kpt =Kgt )
A [(1  )(Kpt =Kgt ) ' + ]1='
Finally, note that since the private investors do not internalize the investment in
green capital and emissions abatement, the Pigovian tax has to be adjusted in order
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to pay for both types of investment. The optimal carbon tax is:
t =
 
!


Kgt
Kpt
 + i!yt[1  {=(Kgt =Kpt )] (33)
The appendix presents an outline of the key equations of this model. For a linear
technology (' = 1), the model admits the following closed form solutions for the
optimal abatement investment rate, growth rate and the depreciation rate are:
i!yt =
A(2   1) + p + !
A(2   1) + p + { (34)
1 +  = [1 + (1  i!yt)A] (35)
gt = (
 
!   {i!yt)[=f{A 1   1 + g] (36)
The optimal carbon tax rate (33) reduces to:
t =
!
A(1  ) + i
!
yt:(1  {=A(1  )) (37)
6.1. Combating a climate shock with technological intervention
Our model provides a pathway to technological intervention to deal with a large
climate shock. Consider an abatement technology with a specic intervention func-
tion which combats emission with a four-year time lag. A climate shock hits the
economy in the form of a green house e¤ect and this e¤ect progressively rises. This
is modelled by raising ! from unity to 1.05 over a period of ve years. An interven-
tion takes place in the form an e¢ cient abatement technology after ve years from
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the onset of the green house e¤ect which is modelled by an upward shift of {: In the
next eleven years, another technological discovery means a further upward shift of
{: After then { progressively rises. We x the other parameter values at A = 0:4;
 = 0:5; p = 0:01: Figure 3 illustrates the e¤ects of this intervention. Growth rate
initially falls due to this climate shock but as soon as the technology is in place, it
starts rising. Abatement investment initially rises at the expense of a lower green
investment. As soon as a more e¢ cient abatement technology is in place, abatement
investment falls due to lower cost of such abatement which is o¤set by a rise in green
investment. The green capital base expands reecting a higher ratio of green to man
made capital. The carbon tax initially rises and then it falls due to a lower cost of
abatement. Green depreciation rst rises, then falls and eventually turns negative
which means green capital regenerates.
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Figure 3: E¤ect of climate change in the presence of an abatement technology
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7. Emissions from Consumption
Until now we have exclusively focused on scenarios where green capital erosion
results purely from production process by carbon intensive man-made capital. We
now turn to a scenario where consumption is the main cause of greenhouse e¤ect.
The damage function due to consumption based emission is formulated as follows:
gt = !
c
t

Ct
Kgt

(38)
The term !ct now represents erosion of green capital due to consumption. Assume
that !ct = !
c. The same principle can be used to derive a balanced growth path.
Sustainable growth is still possible in this environment.
The appendix shows that the static e¢ ciency condition is:


Kgt
Kpt

  p = 	

Kgt
Kpt

(39)
which means that regardless of the initial condition, the economy approaches Kgt =K
p
t
that solves the above static e¢ ciency condition. The allocation of green and man
made capital is Pareto optimal because it is independent of the consumption emission
factor !c. The balanced growth rate is una¤ected by consumption based emission.
The optimal carbon tax ( ct ) is thus zero.
Although Pigovian carbon tax is zero, a corrective tax-subsidy is still needed to
compensate for the loss of natural capital due to consumption based emission. We
have the following proposition.
Proposition 2. If the emission is consumption based, the optimal corrective tax
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policy is to impose a at rate consumption tax ( ct ) on the household to nance green
public investment given by:
 ct =
 + !c(Ct=K
p
t )(K
p
t =K
g
t )
A [(1  )(Kpt =Kgt )' + ]1='
with @
c
t
@!c
> 0.
Proof. Appendix.
Since the source of green house e¤ect is consumption based, households are taxed
on consumption. The tax revenue is used for public investment in green capital to
replenish the stock of green capital eroded by consumption based emission. Such a
tax has welfare consequence because it hurts households consumption but it has no
distortionary e¤ect on capital accumulation.
7.1. Comparing welfare losses from production and consumption based emissions
How does two economies, (i) with production based emissions and (ii) consump-
tion based economy compare in terms of welfare loss? To obtain a consumption
equivalent of such welfare loss, we rst compute the welfare along the balanced
growth path given the stocks of two types of capital at date t.
W (Ct=Yt; ) =
ln(Ct=Yt)
(1  ) +
 ln(1 + )
(1  )2 (40)
Since the stocks of two types of capital, Kpt and K
g
t are given at date t, it means at
the start of date t, the nal output Yt is also given. Since there is no transitional
dynamics in this model, the balanced growth rate is immediately achieved. Thus the
welfare at date t can be conveniently broken down in the consumption/GDP ratio
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(Ct=Yt) at date t and the balanced growth rate . The consumption equivalent of the
welfare loss due to carbon emission can be computed by equating the welfare for zero
emission state with positive emission state and computing the compensating variation
(c) in consumption/GDP ratio. Denoting the zero emission and positive emission
states by a zero and one su¢ xes, the compensating variation c is characterized by:
W0 = W1((Ct=Yt)
1 + c ; 
1) (41)
It is straightforward to verify that c can be explicitly solved as:
c = e
(1 )W 0  ln(1+)
1    (Ct=Yt)1 (42)
Table 2 reports the consumption equivalent of welfare loss (c) as shown in 41)
in two environments, (i) when emissions are production based and (ii) when the
emissions are consumption based. At a low level of emissions (below ! = 0:03);
the consumption loss is slightly higher in case of production based emissions. If the
emissions cross a threshold level 0.02, consumption based emissions hurt welfare more
because of a steeper consumption tax on the households to nance green investment.
Notice that this loss is computed after a corrective tax-subsidy policy is already in
place. This is a deadweight loss due to the erosion of green capital due to emissions.
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Table 2: Percent Consumption loss for production and consumption based emissions
! Baseline Consumption Emissions
0.01 1.13 0.99
0.02 2.05 1.96
0.03 2.74 2.91
0.04 3.33 3.84
0.05 3.80 4.76
8. Conclusion
This paper extends conventional endogenous growth models to demonstrate the
trade-o¤s facing the policy maker to balance sustainable growth with a clean en-
vironment policy. Since the private sector does not internalize the damage to the
environment by carbon emissions, the policy maker imposes a corrective carbon tax
on the private sector. Using alternative models, we show that higher carbon tax
can nearly eliminate the depreciation of green capital caused by emissions if the
production technology allows su¢ cient substitution of man-made capital by green
capital. However, the distortionary e¤ect of this tax lowers long run growth. To
have a sustainable clean growth and to meet the UK Industrial Policy goal, e¤orts
should be made to develop carbon free technologies. The existing technologies are
not su¢ cient to achieve the ambitious policy goals.
To demonstrate the role of a carbon free technologies, we extend our model en-
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vironment to include public investment in emissions abatement. Our model shows
that with a highly e¢ cient pollution abatement technology, the adverse growth ef-
fect of environmental control can be mitigated or even reversed if the abatement
technology is e¢ cient and proactive to climate shock. The carbon tax could be also
lowered. The policy lesson is that the adverse e¤ect of carbon tax on growth can be
reversed by emissions abatement technology in the form of carbon capture solutions
such as forestation, carbon capture and storage. In addition, this alternative tech-
nology should be supplemented by more green investment. A carbon tax can help
the transition to this new technology.
We nally extend our model to depict a scenario of consumption based emissions.
If the green house e¤ect arises primarily due to food wastage, it has no e¤ect on the
allocative e¢ ciency of the economy. As a result, the optimal carbon tax should
be zero. However, a positive consumption tax is warranted to nance the public
investment in natural capital to replenish the lost green capital. Such a consumption
tax entails a deadweight loss to the society. Welfare comparison suggests that the
loss from both production and consumption based emissions are non-trivial.
Our key results are likely to be robust even if we add a pollution distaste function
in the preference as Michelle and Rotillon (1995). A useful future extension of our
model is to consider adverse health e¤ect of emissions as in Gradus and Smulders
(1993). Such an extension would strengthen the case for a steeper Pigovian carbon
tax. However, the e¤ect on growth caused by the carbon tax is likely to be ambiguous.
While the distortionary e¤ects of carbon tax would lower the long run growth, a
positive e¤ect on health may promote growth via human capital.
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A. Appendix
The present value Lagrangian is given by:
Lp =
1X
t=0
t lnCt +
1X
t=0
t

(1  igyt)AKt + (1  p)Kpt   Ct  Kpt+1

(A.1)
+
1X
t=0
t

Kgt + i
g
ytAKt   !Kpt  Kgt+1

where {t} and {t} are the lagrange multipliers. The rst order conditions are:
Ct : 
t=Ct   t = 0 (A.2)
Kpt+1 :   t + t+1

(1  igyt+1)A
@Kt+1
@Kpt+1
+ 1  p

  t+1! + t+1Aigyt+1
@Kt+1
@Kpt+1
= 0
(A.3)
Kgt+1 : t+1(1  igyt+1)A
@Kt+1
@Kgt+1
  t + t+1

1 + Aigyt+1
@Kt+1
@Kgt+1

= 0 (A.4)
igyt :   t + t = 0 (A.5)
Eq (A.5) is the foundation of the crucial static e¢ ciency condition that equates the
marginal distortion from the tax rate to the marginal benet of the tax to nance
green capital. Plugging (A.5) into (A.3) and using (A.2), we get:
Ct+1
Ct
= 

A
@Kt+1
@Kpt+1
+ 1  p    !

(A.6)
Likewise, plugging (A.5) into (A.4) and using (A.2), we get:
Ct+1
Ct
= 

A
@Kt+1
@Kgt+1
+ 1

(A.7)
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Equating (A.6) to (A.7), one obtains the static e¢ ciency condition (9).
To get the optimal carbon tax formula (19), equate the right hand sides of (A.6)
and (A.7).
A.1. Case of strict complementarity
Since the production function in (20) is Leontief type, the e¢ cient ratio KPt =K
g
t
is pinned down by the technology and is equal to unity. Equation (4) reduces to:
1 +  = 1  ! + igyA (A.8)
To get the optimal green investment ratio igy, we need to recast the social planning
problem and derive the balanced growth rate from the social planners perspective.
The social planner now no longer chooses the ratio of green to made made capital
because it is pinned down by the technology at a xed proportion (KPt =K
g
t = 1).
Setting Kgt = K
p
t , the economy wide resource constraint can be reduced to:
Ct + 2K
p
t+1   (2  p   !)Kpt = AKpt
The present value lagrangian can be written as:
Lp =
1X
t=0
t lnCt +
1X
t=0

0
t

(2 + A  !   p)AKpt   Ct   2Kpt+1

(A.9)
where f0tg is the sequence of Lagrange multipliers associated with the ow resource
constraints.
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The rst order conditions are:
Ct : 
t=Ct   0t = 0 (A.10)
Kpt+1 :   2
0
t + 
0
t+1(2 + A  !   p) = 0 (A.11)
Now it is straightforward by using (A.10) and (A.11) that the balanced growth rate
is given by:
1 +  = 

1 +
A  !   p
2

(A.12)
Using (A.8) and (A.12), the optimal investment ratio in green capital given by:
igy =
f1 + 0:5(A  p)g   1 + !(1  :5)
A
(A.13)
To get the optimal carbon tax, we need to use the households Euler equation
(19) which reduces to:
Ct+1
Ct
=  [(1  t+1)A+ 1  p] (A.14)
Along the balanced growth path (A.14) reduces to:
1 +  =  [(1  )A+ 1  p] (A.15)
Equating (A.12) with (A.15), we get:
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 = 0:5 + A 1(1  0:5p) + 0:5A 1! (A.16)
A.2. Model with pollution abatement
The present value Lagrangian is given by:
Lp =
1X
t=0
t lnCt +
1X
t=0
t

(1  igyt   i!yt)AKt + (1  p)Kpt   Ct  Kpt+1

(A.17)
+
1X
t=0
t

Kgt + i
g
ytAKt   !(i!yt)Kpt  Kgt+1

where {t} and {t} are the lagrange multipliers. The rst order conditions are:
Ct : 
t=Ct   t = 0 (A.18)
Kpt+1 :  t+t+1

(1  igyt+1   i!yt+1)A
@Kt+1
@Kpt+1
+ 1  p

 t+1

!(i!yt+1) + Ai
g
yt+1
@Kt+1
@Kpt+1

= 0
(A.19)
Kgt+1 : t+1(1  igyt+1   i!yt+1)A
@Kt+1
@Kgt+1
  t + t+1

1 + Aigyt+1
@Kt+1
@Kgt+1

= 0 (A.20)
igyt :   t + t = 0 (A.21)
i!yt :   t!0(i!yt)Kpt   tAKt = 0 (A.22)
Use (25), (A.21) and (A.22) to verify (29). Use (A.19) and (A.21) to get the balanced
growth equation (32).
A.3. Model of consumption based emissions
The present value Lagrangian is given by:
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Lp =
1X
t=0
t lnCt +
1X
t=0
t

(1  igyt)AKt + (1  p)Kpt   Ct  Kpt+1

(A.23)
+
1X
t=0
t

Kgt + i
g
ytAKt   !cCt  Kgt+1

where {t} and {t} are the lagrange multipliers. The rst order conditions are:
Ct : 
t=Ct   t   !ct = 0 (A.24)
Kpt+1 :   t + t+1

(1  igyt+1)A
@Kt+1
@Kpt+1
+ 1  p

+ t+1Ai
g
yt+1
@Kt+1
@Kpt+1
= 0 (A.25)
Kgt+1 : t+1(1  igyt+1)A
@Kt+1
@Kgt+1
  t + t+1

1 + Aigyt+1
@Kt+1
@Kgt+1

= 0 (A.26)
igyt :   t + t = 0 (A.27)
Using (A.24) and (A.26), one gets, t = t=(1 + !c) which upon substitution in
(A.25) and (A.26), yields
Ct+1
Ct
= 

A
@Kt+1
@Kpt+1
+ 1  p

(A.28)
Ct+1
Ct
= 

A
@Kt+1
@Kgt+1
+ 1

(A.29)
Use of (A.28) and (A.29) yields the static e¢ ciency condition.
A.4. Proof of Proposition 2
Plug in (38) into (4) to get:
Kgt+1 = K
g
t  $cCt + igytYt
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which can be rewritten after imposing balanced growth condition as:
1 +  = 1 $c(Ct=Kpt )(Kpt =Kgt ) + igyt(Yt=Kgt )
Plugging the production function (1) and (2), one obtains
igyt =
 + !c(Ct=K
p
t )(K
p
t =K
g
t )
A [(1  )(Kpt =Kgt )' + ]1='
(A.30)
Rewrite the economy-wide resource constraint: Ct + I
p
t = (1  igyt)Yt as:
(1 + !c)(Ct=K
p
t ) + (1 +K
g
t =K
p
t ) + p = A [(1  ) + (Kgt =Kpt )']1='
Since Kgt =K
p
t and the balanced growth rate () are independent of the growth rate,
verify that @ ln(Ct=K
p
t )
@ ln!c
=  !
c
1+!c
: In other words, the absolute value of the elasticity of
Ct=K
p
t with respect to !
c is less than unity. This means !c(Ct=K
p
t ) in eq (A.30) is
increasing in !c: Since Kpt =K
g
t is invariant to !
c,
@igyt
@!c
> 0:
Since the carbon tax is zero, it follows from the government budget constraint
(15) that igytYt+Tt = 0 which means that  Tt=Yt = igyt: Use of the households budget
constraint (16) immediately reveals that this is equivalent to a at rate consumption
tax rate ( ct ) equal to i
g
yt:
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